Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more …elds of law enforcement, though their deterrence e¤ects are often hard to observe, and the likely e¤ect of changes in the speci…c features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the e¤ects of …nes, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistleblowers on …rms'decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on their price choices. Our subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with di¤erentiated goods and uncertain duration, and we run several treatments di¤ering in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of …ne, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a …ne), the existence of a reward for reporting. We …nd that …nes following successful investigations but without leniency have a deterrence e¤ect (reduce the number of cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive e¤ect (increase collusive prices in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more e¢ cient than standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they do deter a signi…cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also induce even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing average market price signi…cantly up relative to treatments without antitrust enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, which completely disrupts subjects'ability to form cartels and sustain high prices, and almost complete deterrence is achieved. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program the deterrence e¤ect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise. As for tacit collusion, under standard antitrust enforcement or leniency programs subjects who do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels) tend to choose weakly higher prices than where there is no anti-trust enforcement. We also analyze post-conviction behavior, …nding that there is a strong ex-post deterrence (desistance) e¤ect. Moreover post-conviction prices are on average lower than before even though the average prices within cartels are the same. Finally, we …nd a strong cultural e¤ect comparing treatments in Stockholm with those in Rome, suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions di¤er with culture.
Introduction
is precious little else to look at than discovered and prosecuted cases. Contrary to most other types of crimes, where there are conscious victims that denounce and thereby signal the frequency of the crime independently from the fraction of these crimes where the criminal is detected and convicted, victims of cartels and analogous forms of organized crime (corruption, fraud, etc.) are mostly not aware of them. This implies that we cannot directly observe the total population of cartels in society and how this changes with the introduction of new policies, though indirect methods o¤er partial indications (see e.g. Harrington, 2006; Miller, 2007) . 5 This intrinsic lack of observability, accompanied by the fact that many design features of the proposed and theoretically analyzed schemes have never been implemented in reality, makes experimental investigation a useful policy tool, as it o¤ers an almost unique possibility to measure the likely changes in deterrence, prices and welfare caused by the many di¤erent possible designs of law enforcement policies.
We consider an experimental framework, as close as possible to the strategic situation agents face in an oligopolistic industry subject to current antitrust laws, in which subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with di¤erentiated goods. Subjects can decide to coordinate on price (and thus they form a cartel). We consider several treatments di¤ering in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of …ne, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a …ne), the existence of a reward for reporting. We are not the …rst to look at these issues experimentally. Apesteguia, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) , for example, have already produced instructive pieces of work in this direction. However, as will be explained in depth in the next section discussing the literature, we found that both those previous experiments could be further improved in one way or another, and that they do not cover most of the important policy issues we wanted to deal with in our experiment. In particular we …nd new results on secret reports, reward schemes, the interaction between …nes, leniency and deterrence and tacit collusion.
We found that traditional antitrust law enforcement, …nes following successful investigations of the competition authority and no leniency, has a deterrence e¤ect (reduces the number of cartels formed) but also has a pro-collusive e¤ect (increases collusive prices). Leniency programs might not be more e¢ cient than standard antitrust enforcement, since they do deter a signi…cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also induce higher prices in cartels that are not reported. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program, as under the US leniency policy, the deterrence e¤ect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, disrupting completely subjects'ability to form cartels and to sustain high prices. Also, we …nd that when the reward scheme is 'wrongly designed' in the sense that it can be exploited, in our case by completely eliminating the risk of being …ned at no cost, subjects do not recognize the possibility to manipulate and gain from the scheme, a result in line with recent experiments in other …elds (see e.g. Dal Bo, 2005) . We also analyze post-conviction behavior, …nding that there is a strong ex post deterrence (desistance) e¤ect. Moreover post-conviction prices are on average lower than before even though the average prices within cartels are the same. As a …rst step for analyzing tacit collusion, we focus on subjects' behavior when they do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels). We …nd that under standard antitrust enforcement or leniency programs, subjects who do not communicate choose signi…cantly higher prices than where there is no antitrust enforcement whatsoever. This is not the case anymore when reward schemes are introduced. Finally, we …nd a strong cultural e¤ect comparing treatments in Stockholm with those in Rome, suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions di¤er with culture.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature, theoretical and experimental. Section 3 describes the underlying theoretical model and the experimental design, contrasting it with previous ones. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes, discussing implications for the theory and practice of designing deterrence mechanisms for cartels and similar forms of organized crime. An appendix contains the instructions for the experiment.
Literature review 2.1 Theory
Starting with the contributions of Motta and Polo (2003) , Rey (2003) , and Spagnolo (2000a,b) , a theoretical literature has blossomed in the last decade that analyzes the optimal design of anti-cartel policies based on the provision of incentives to breach trust and to self-report. 6 Di¤erent e¤ects of leniency and rewards are considered in this literature. The focus here is on the deterrence e¤ects of the …rst part of the leniency policies, restricted to …rms that self-report before an investigation by the competition authority has invested them. The most important e¤ects identi…ed by the literature in this respect are:
1. The protection from …nes e¤ ect. Spagnolo (2000a Spagnolo ( , 2004 and Rey (2003) suggest that amnesty o¤ered to the …rst …rm reporting before an investigation is launched may have deterrence e¤ects by ensuring that if a cartel member wants to undercut the cartel, it can report and avoid paying the …ne. 2. The reward e¤ ect. Spagnolo (2000a Spagnolo ( , 2004 , Spagnolo (2001, 2006) , Rey (2003) and Aubert et al. (2006) suggest that rewards could further increase deterrence by generating stronger temptations to undercut the cartel and cash the reward by reporting. Spagnolo (2000a Spagnolo ( , 2004 shows that such a mechanism can for the …rst time deliver the …rst best in a model a la Becker (1968) , complete deterrence without investigation costs, provided that …nes are su¢ ciently but …nitely large, and that the reward is lower than total …nes.
3. The 'reporting as a threat' and 'what does not kills us makes us stronger' e¤ ects. Spagnolo (2000b) and Spagnolo (2001, 2006) show that when self-reporting becomes attractive thanks to leniency programs, the threat of self-reporting to punish an agent that did not behave as the cartel agreed upon may also become credible, and may be exploited to enforce cartels that would not be sustainable otherwise. Building on this idea, Ellis and Wilson (2001) obtain a related e¤ect, showing that, for cartels that are not deterred, leniency programs have the e¤ect of reinforcing/stabilizing collusion. The reason is that if a cartel is formed, then leniency induces cartel members to self-report after any defection from agreed collusive strategies, thereby strengthening the punishment for defections of an amount equal to antitrust …nes.
4. Tacit collusion and post-conviction pricing. Antitrust doctrine agreed in the 50s that the focus should be restricted to 'explicit cartels', i.e. to conspiracies where …rm managers meet or communicate with the explicit objective of coordinating on higher prices, and leave alone tacit collusion, i.e. cases where …rms manage to coordinate on and sustain high prices without explicit communication. Whinston (2006) reopened the debate, arguing that what is important for welfare are prices, so that we should re ‡ect more on how antitrust enforcement may a¤ect …rms'ability to sustain high prices, even when high prices are sustained by tacit collusion. On a di¤erent but related stance, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) suggest that antitrust …nes might have the e¤ect of inducing …rms to increase collusive prices following conviction, either because they do not realize they are a 'sunk cost'and try to recover them through higher margins, or because paid …nes may help …rms coordinating on higher post-conviction prices sustained by tacit collusion.
We discuss these e¤ects when we present the experimental results. Apesteguia, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007) , and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) were the …rst to analyze experimentally the e¤ects of leniency policies on cartel deterrence. 6 Other early pieces include Aubert et al. (2006) , Spagnolo (2001, 2006) , Ellis and Wilson (2001) , Harrington (2006) and Harrington and Chen (2007) . See Spagnolo (2006) for a review of this growing theoretical literature. 7 More recently Harrington (forthcoming) coined a perhaps nicer acronym for the same e¤ect, deviator amnesty e¤ ect, but here we stick to temporal priority. 8 We are aware of two other studies that deal with not exactly the same issues but are somewhat related. Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) design an experiment where subjects are forced to collude. Most obviously, such a setup cannot address the 2.2.1 Apesteguia, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007) Apesteguia et al. (2007) conducted the …rst experimental investigation of the e¤ects of Leniency policies and rewards schemes on cartel deterrence. This elegant paper …rst develops a stylized theoretical framework that tries to capture the main points made in the theoretical literature mentioned earlier on the general deterrence e¤ects of leniency policies, and then uses it to undertake an experimental analysis of these e¤ects. The market game they focus on is dynamic extension of a one-shot homogeneous discrete Bertrand oligopoly game that incorporates di¤erent legal frameworks. The oligopoly game is embedded in four alternative legal frameworks: in Ideal there is no antitrust law, explicit cartels are not possible (communication is not allowed), and colluding …rms face neither full nor reduced …nes; in Standard convicted …rms face …nes equal to 10% of their revenue and no …ne reduction if they report; in Leniency …rms that report a cartel they took part in receive a reduction in their …ne; in Bonus reporting …rms receive part of the …nes paid by other …rms as a reward. Collusive subgame perfect equilibria, including one implementing the monopoly price, exist in both Standard and Leniency, sustained by the credible threat of reporting if a defection takes place. The reason why the threat is credible also in Standard is that if a …rm defects in an homogeneous Bertrand game, its opponent will have no revenue, so even if there is no leniency self-reporting is costless for a party whose opponent defected and is therefore a credible threat that can sustain collusion in the one-shot game. The experimental setting allows for pre-play communication and let subjects play in groups of three, and for the rest it follows closely the theoretical model just described.
Experiments
This path-breaking experimental study appears to con…rm that agents understand and use the threat of reporting to sustain collusion in the one-shot Bertrand game: prices are substantially higher in Standard and in Leniency, where collusive equilibria exist sustained by the threat to self-report if cheated upon, than in Ideal where no such threat is available and the only equilibrium is the Bertrand one. Leniency is also found to have a signi…cant deterrence e¤ect relative to Standard, although prices are much higher with antitrust (either Standard or Leniency) than without (in Ideal ). Surprisingly, the experimental results are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions that rewarding reporting …rms should reduce cartel formation: the Bonus treatment has non-signi…cant e¤ects on collusion.
As argued by the authors, this paper is an important …rst exploratory step in the experimental analysis of deterrence mechanisms for carteks and organized crime in general; and as any explorative analysis it makes some simpli…cations that may a¤ect results in a non trivial way. The …rst simpli…cation is the theoretical and experimental framework, that allows for only one round of decisions, limiting subjects ability to learn their envirnoment and punish through price choices. The limited scope for learning in particular may have been relevant when subject choose among equilibria in Standard and Leniency, and in their understanding the di¤erences Bonus bring in. As the authors conjecture, it is possible that the surprising result on the ine¤ectiveness of Bonus is driven, at least in part, by subjects inability fully grasp the rather complex strategic situation. In our experiment we try to shed additional lights on these points by having both a repeated game, and …ve initial rounds for subjects to experiment the game.
The second feature on which we have tried to improve on Apesteguia et al. is the theoretical framework used for the experiment, that resembles closely that in Spagnolo (2000b) but for the …nes, that the set equal to 10% of …rms'revenue. With this kind of …nes and Bertrand comoetition, even without leniency programs in place (i.e. even in the Standard treatment), reporting after a deviation becomes a credible threat that can enforce price collusion. If a partner-cartelist undercuts a price-…xing agreement, reporting it becomes costless for the other cartelist, since in the homogeneous Bertrand game the revenue when an opponent deviates is zero, and so is the …ne. In reality …nes are capped as a percentage of revenue, but revenue is relative to …rms'total yearly turnover in the last period the cartel was active; in an appropriately dynamic framework, therefore, …nes would never be zero because of a defection. Moreover, it is hard to imagine a market where, if a …rm undercuts the cartel, other …rms have zero revenue for one full year: …rms are active in many markets and total business stealing appears impossible in reality, so that absent leniency policies, a …rm that reports a cartel would always be subject to a positive …ne.
issue of how di¤erent policies perform in terms of cartel deterrence. Hamaguchi et al. (2007) adapt the setup of Hinloopen and Soetevent but to a repeated procurement auction with leniency programs. They consider a di¤erent game since there is only one winner at each period, so when players are colluding, they have to decide who will win the auction. They found evidence of deterrence e¤ects with Leniency programs as well as higher prices under leniency and antitrust than under communication.
These considerations may suggest that, given that without leniency reporting is costly in reality, the multiplicity of equilibria in Standard should not be considered policy relevant, and the deterrence e¤ect of Leniency relative to Standard identi…ed by Apesteguia et al. (2007) may therefore be in ‡ated by an unrealistically collusive benchmark. On the other hand, in a repeated/dynamic environment -as in realityreporting in the absence of leniency may be a credible threat even if there are costly sanctions for the reporting party: in the end, most types of punishments studied for repeated oligopolies are costly for the punisher (think of price wars for example). Therefore, the procollusive e¤ect of Standard in Apesteguia et al.'s static set up may end up capturing the possible dynamic procollusive e¤ects of the increased punishment possibilities o¤ered by antitrust …nes. In this case the deterrence e¤ect of Leniency would not be overestimated. To shed some light on these alternatives, in our experiment we chose an in…nitely repeated Bertrand game with di¤erentiated products, and we …xed the level of …nes rather than setting …nes that go to zero when the opponent defected. This also allow us to control precisely subject expectations on …nes.
Our experiment then tackles many additional policy questions that could not be analyzed in Apesteguia et al.'s exploratory set up, including the e¤ects of di¤erent features of antitrust law enforcement, and their e¤ects on market prices inside and outside cartels and before and after detection, on desistance, and on recidivism.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006)
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) study experimentally the general deterrence e¤ect but also the desistance e¤ect of Leniency Programs. They use an in…nite horizon set up that allows for communication before prices are chosen each period, and where the stage game is the same homogeneous Bertrand game used by Apesteguia et al. (2007) . Subjects are matched in groups of three at the beginning of each treatment, and then play without re-matchings for at least 20 rounds, after which the continuation probability falls to 80%.
They embedded this repeated game in four di¤erent treatments: Benchmark, where subjects cannot communicate; Communication, where subjects can communicate before choosing prices; Antitrust, where subjects that communicated are exposed to a positive probability of being detected and …ned; and Leniency, which di¤ers from Antitrust by the possibility to self-report after the choice of price and before the random audit by the competition authority. In Leniency, therefore, subjects can only self-report after prices have been chosen and made public, so that subjects cannot both secretly report and secretly undercut the collusive price -a possibility in reality where competition authorities may keep the report secret to arrange for dawn raids, allowing (or even asking to) the reporting …rm to secretly undercut former cartel partners. Fines are also equal to 10% of revenue in the period of conviction, but there is a …xed cost of reporting under the leniency program. This feature eliminates Apesteguia et al.'s (2007) one-shot collusive equilibria sustained by the threat of reporting after defections.
These authors'main …ndings are that leniency: (i) increases cartel deterrence (fewer cartels are formed); (ii) reduces the duration of cartels that are not deterred (agents that form a cartel defect more afterwards); and (iii) makes agents defect more aggressively than in the absence of the Leniency Program. They do not …nd that the leniency program a¤ects the likelihood that a detected and …ned cartel forms again thereafter (no e¤ects on recidivism).
Although Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) is the experimental work which is closest to what we do, our experiments di¤er from theirs in several respects.
First, in each stage-game, subjects can both self-report and set prices before these choices are observed by other subjects. Thus the subjects have the possibility to simultaneously secretly report and defect/undercut cartel partners, much like in reality; in addition they also have the possibility to self-report after observing price choices, provided nobody reported before prices were disclosed. By adding realism, we consider this a major improvement. This design also allows us to disentangle and quantify reports linked to defections (the 'protection from …nes' e¤ect discussed in section 2.1) and reports that are made to punish defections (the 'reporting as a threat' or 'what does not kill us makes us stronger' e¤ects discussed in section 2.1). Note also that in our experimental design and as in reality, reporting to the Antitrust authority is always possible even if this leads to no reduction in …nes.
Second, we have …xed …nes. The main reason is that when …nes are equal to 10% of the revenues in the period in which the cartel is detected -a design adopted in the two previously mentioned experimental studies -…nes vary a lot with the outcome of the stage-game in which a cartel happens to be detected. Thereby it is not clear what the expected …ne as perceived by subjects actually is, making it more di¢ cult to analyze the role of …nes and their interaction with the di¤erent policies. Third we follow Apesteguia et al. (2007) in framing the experiment explicitly as a cartel/antitrust game, rather than having a "neutral" frame as in Hinloopen and Soetevent. Thereby subjects are probably less likely to misunderstand the game and social preferences are less likely to have an impact on subjects'choices.
Fourth, we use a perhaps more realistic oligopoly model, a repeated di¤erentiated product Bertrand game.
Fifth, our subjects are rematched with positive and constant probability all along the treatments, so that each supergame has a constant continuation probability, like in Dal Bó (2005) , Dal Bó and Frechette (2007) , and Blonski et al. (2007) .
Sixth, we use duopolies rather than triopolies, to avoid that agents may be unwilling to punish defections too hard by the unwillingness to harm a third 'innocent'(non-defecting) party, as suggested by Holt (1995) .
In addition, and again di¤erently from Hinloopen and Soetevent, we consider other important e¤ects, in particular the e¤ects of rewards for whistleblowers. Thereby we are able to test in an appropriately dynamic environment the robustness of Apesteguia et al.'s (2006) surprising …nding regarding reward schemes.
Experimental Design
Our experimental design is most closely related to the one by Hinloopen and Soetevent, but we introduce a number of crucial modi…cations. Our innovations are mainly relative to the timing when subjects can self-report, the …nes' structure, the oligopoly game, and the framing of the experiment. We also consider two extra treatments, Reward and LenRing, which will be discussed in detail below when we describe our experiment.
In our experiment, each subject represented a …rm and played in anonymous two-persons groups a repeated duopoly game. In every stage game, the subjects had to take three types of decisions. First, they had to choose a price in a discrete Bertrand price game with di¤erentiated goods. Second, they had to decide whether or not to form a cartel by discussing prices. Third, the subjects could choose to self report cartels to a competition authority. The attractiveness of this latter opportunity depended on the details of the antitrust law enforcement institution -the treatment variables of our experiment.
The Bertrand game
In each period, the subjects had to choose a price from the choice set f0; 1; :::; 11; 12g. The resulting pro…ts depended on their own price choice and on the price chosen by their competitor and were reported in a pro…t table distributed to the subjects (see Table 1 ). This table was derived from the following standard linear Bertrand game. (The details of the Bertrand game were not described to the subjects.)
The demand function for each …rm i was given by:
where p i (p j ) is the price chosen by …rm i (…rm j), a is a parameter accounting for the market size and 2 [0; 1) denotes the degree of substitutability between the two …rms'products. Each …rm faced a constant marginal cost, c, and had no …xed costs. The pro…t function, i (p i ; p j ), was thus given by
In our experimental setup, we chose a = 36, c = 0 and = 4=5 and restricted the subjects' choice set to f0; 2; :::; 22; 24g. These parameters yield the payo¤ table distributed to each subject. To simplify the table we also relabeled each price by dividing it by 2 and rounded the payo¤s to the closest integer. In the unique Bertrand equilibrium, both …rms charge a price equal to 3 yielding per …rm pro…ts of 100. Table 1 : Pro…ts in the Bertrand game monopoly price (charged by both …rms) is 9, yielding pro…ts of 180. Note also that a …rm would earn 296 by unilaterally and optimally undercutting the monopoly price, i.e. by charging a price of 7. In this case the other (cheated upon) …rm only earns a pro…t of 20. Similarly, there are gains from deviating unilaterally from other common prices than the monopoly price as well as associated losses for the cheated upon …rm; in the range of prices in between the Bertrand price and the monopoly price, i.e. in the range f4; :::; 8g, these gains and losses are smaller than when a subject deviates unilaterally from the monopoly price.
Cartel formation
Throughout the experiment, the subjects could form cartels by discussing prices. At the beginning of every period, a communication window opened if and only if both subjects agreed to communicate. This communication stage, which is described in more detail below, was designed in such a way that it would result in a common price on which to cooperate. This agreed upon price was non-binding, however, and therefore each subject could cheat on the agreement by subsequently charging a price di¤erent from the agreed upon price. Whenever two subjects chose to communicate, they were considered to have formed a cartel. In this case, the subjects risked to be …ned as long as the competition authority had not yet detected the cartel. This implied that two subjects could be …ned in a period even if no communication took place in that speci…c period; for example, two subjects could be …ned in a period in which they did not communicate if they had communicated in the previous period and the competition authority had not detected the associated cartel in that period. Once a cartel was detected, however, it was considered to be dismantled and in subsequent periods, the former cartelists did not run any risk of being …ned unless they communicated again.
Antitrust law enforcement (Treatments)
Whenever two subjects had formed a cartel, a competition authority could detect the cartel and convict its members for price …xing. Detection could happen in two ways. First, in every period, the competition authority detected cartels with an exogenous probability, . If this happened, both cartel members had to pay an exogenous …ne, F . Second, the cartel members could self-report the cartel, in which case the cartel members were convicted for price …xing with certainty. If this happened, the size of the …ne depended on the details of the law enforcement institution.
We ran …ve types of treatments and we adopted a between subjects design, so that every subject only played the game under a single treatment. Each treatment corresponded to a speci…c type of antitrust law, that is our treatment variables were the di¤erent law enforcement institutions. The di¤erences between the treatments are summarized in Table 2 . Only for the player who's the last to decide to communicate.
Our baseline treatment corresponds to a laisser faire regime and is denoted Communication: in this treatment, = F = 0 so that forming a cartel by discussing prices is legal. To simplify the instructions and to eliminate irrelevant alternatives, subjects were not allowed to report cartels. In the four other treatments, denoted Antitrust, Leniency, LenRing and Reward, the expected …ne (given that no reports took place) was strictly positive ( = 0:1 and F = 200 yielding an expected …ne F = 20) and cartel members were allowed to report cartels in which they participated. The Antitrust treatment corresponds to traditional antitrust laws without any leniency program: in case a report took place, both cartel members (including the reporting one) had to pay the full …ne F . The Leniency treatment corresponds to current antitrust laws embedded with a leniency program: in case the cartel was reported by one of the cartel members only, the reporting member paid no …ne while the other one paid the full …ne, F ; if instead both cartel members reported the cartel simultaneously, both paid a reduced …ne equal to F=2. The treatment LenRing was identical to Leniency except that the …rst subject attempting to communicate was treated as the cartel's initiator -the so-called ringleader -and, as a result, was not eligible for the leniency program. (The way the ringleader was identi…ed is described in more detail below). Finally, the Reward treatment di¤ered from Leniency in one respect only: if only one cartel member reported the cartel, his/her …ne was not only reduced to 0; in addition, he was rewarded with the full …ne, F , paid by the other cartel member.
In addition to these …ve treatments, we also ran a number of other treatments to check the robustness of our results to changes in and F . First, we ran two additional antitrust and leniency treatments with higher expected …nes equal to 60 ( = 0:2 and F = 300). These treatments were denoted AntiHigh and LenHigh respectively. Second, we ran two additional reward treatments, both with an expected …ne equal to 0 ( = 0) but with di¤erent …nes. The treatment denoted RewLow had a relatively low …ne (F = 200) while RewHigh had a high …ne (F = 1000).
The experiment' s timing and the rematching procedure
At the end of each period, subjects were rematched with the same competitor with a probability of 85%. With the remaining probability of 15%, all subjects were randomly matched into new pairs. When this happened, the history in the previous match did no longer matter; for example, a subject could no longer be …ned for a cartel formed in a previous match. The subjects were also informed that the experiment would end if more than 20 periods had passed and the 15% probability event took place or if the experiment lasted for more than 2 hours and 30 minutes. This latter possibility was so unlikely that it never happened. This re-matching procedure had several advantages. First, the subjects were playing truly in…nitely repeated games without problems associated with end e¤ects. Second, each subject played several repeated games against di¤erent competitors. Thereby we observed the subjects' behavior in a larger number of repeated games.
Before the experiment started, the subjects were paired with the same competitor for …ve practice periods. During these practice periods, subjects were assigned to di¤erent competitors than those that they faced in the …rst period of the 'true'(i.e. remunerated) experiment. Participants were informed about this. Step 1: Communication decision. Each subject was asked whether or not he wished to communicate with his competitor. If both subjects pushed the yes button within 15 seconds, the game proceeded to step 2. Otherwise the two subjects had to wait for additional 30 seconds before pricing decisions were taken in
Step 3. In all periods, subjects were also informed whether they were matched with the same opponent as in the previous round or if a re-match had taken place.
In the treatment LenRing, the …rst subject to push the button within the time window of 15 seconds was treated as the ringleader. If instead only one of the subjects pushed the yes button, then this subject was treated as a ringleader even if the cartel was formed in later periods. In either case, both subjects were informed at the end of Step 1 about the identity of the (possibly only potential) ringleader.
Step 2: Communication. If both subjects decided to communicate in step 1, a window appeared on their computer screen asking them to simultaneously state a minimum acceptable price in the range f0; :::; 12g. When both of them had chosen a price, they entered a second round of price negotiations, in which they could choose a price from the new range fp min ; :::; 12g, where p min was de…ned as the minimum among the two prices selected in the previous negotiation round. This procedure went on until 30 seconds had passed. The resulting minimum price p min was referred to as the agreed upon price.
Step 3: Pricing. Each subject had to choose his price from the choice set f0; :::; 12g. Possible price agreements reached in step 2 were not binding. The subjects were informed that if they failed to choose a price within 30 seconds, then their default price would be so high that their pro…ts became 0.
Step 4: First Reporting Decision. If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been discovered by the competition authority, subjects had a …rst opportunity to report the cartel.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision. Subjects learned the prices set by their opponent. If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods and was not yet discovered by the competition authority and nobody had reported it in step 4, subjects had again the opportunity to report the cartel. The crucial di¤erence between this second reporting opportunity and the …rst one is that the subjects knew the price chosen by the competitor. In addition the subjects were informed about their own pro…ts and the pro…ts of their competitor, gross of the possible …ne.
Step 6: Detection. If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been discovered or reported in steps 4 or 5, the competition authority discovered the cartel with probability .
Step 7: Summary of the current period. At the end of each period, all the relevant information about the stage game was displayed: agreed upon price (if any), prices chosen by the two players, possible …nes and net pro…ts. In case players were …ned, they were also told how many players reported. This step lasted 20 seconds
Note that with our experimental setup subjects have two opportunities to report the cartel: …rst at step 4, right after having set their price, then again at step 5, after having been informed about the price chosen by their opponent. In our design, reporting can thus be used for two di¤erent purposes: (i) deviating subjects may report to get protection against prosecution and (ii) cheated upon subjects may report to punish their opponents, if they have not reported before.
Experimental procedure
Our experiment took place in March, April, May and December 2007 at the Stockholm School of Economics (Sweden) and at Tor Vergata university (Rome, Italy). Session lasted on average 2 hours, including instructions and payment. The average payment was: (i) in Stockholm Euros 26.49, with a minimum of 15.3 and a maximum of 36 and (ii) in Rome Euros 24.45 with a minimum of 16.5 and a maximum of 31.5. 9 We ran a treatment for every session; the number of subjects per session ranged from 16 to 32, and the total number of subjects was 194.
Subjects were welcomed in the lab and seated, each in front of a computer. When all subjects were ready, a printed version of the instructions and the pro…t table was distributed to them. Instructions were read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the rules of the game. The subjects were then asked to read the instructions on their own and ask questions, which were answered privately. When everybody had read the instructions and there were no more questions (which always happened after about …fteen minutes), each subject was randomly matched with another subject for the …ve practice rounds. After the practice rounds, participants had again a last opportunity to ask questions about the rules of the game. Again, they were answered privately. Then they were randomly rematched into new pairs and the real play started.
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid privately in cash. The subjects started with an initial endowment of 1000 points in order to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. At the end of the experiment the subjects were paid an amount equal to their cumulated earnings (including the initial endowment) plus a show up fee of 7 Euros. The conversion rate was 200 points for 1 Euro.
Equilibrium set
In the games presented above, the equilibrium structure can be described in the following way. For each treatment and each price that the …rms want to collude on, there exists a critical discount factor such that the …rms can collude on the desired price level if and only if the …rms'discount factor is larger than the critical discount factor. While it is not trivial to …nd these critical discount factors for each treatment, it is possible to rank them. Let Communication , Antitrust , Leniency , LenRing and Re ward denote the critical discount factors for the, Communication, Antitrust, Leniency, LenRing and Reward treatments respectively. Provided that the probability of detection, , and the size of the …ne, F , are equal in all treatments, then it can be shown that 0 = Antitrust < Communication < Leniency = LenRing < Re w < 1:
The only surprising feature of this ranking is that collusion can be sustained for any discount factor in the Antitrust treatment ( Anti = 0). The reason is simple: in the stage game, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium to collude. Indeed, if both …rms'strategies stipulate that one should report the cartel whenever a …rm unilaterally deviates from the collusive price, then it is no longer pro…table to deviate due to the reports. Furthermore, the reports are credible: since both …rms (including the deviating one) report the cartel following a deviation, both …rms are indi¤erent between reporting and not reporting, and thus reporting is an equilibrium in the reporting subgame. Of course, the weakness of this subgame perfect equilibrium is that it is sustained through weakly dominated strategies. When the stage game is in…nitely repeated, however, it is easy to construct strategies with the same ‡avor, which are not weakly dominated.
The key to the above observation is that in the Antitrust treatment, reports can be used as punishments against deviators. This is not the case in the other treatments. In the Communication treatment, it is trivial that reports cannot be used. To see that reports cannot be used as punishments in the remaining treatments, note that optimal deviations involve secret reports. Thus cartels are dismantled after unilateral deviations and therefore reports cannot be used as punishments. For this reason, the ranking of the remaining critical discount factor is the expected one.
Empirical Methodology
A critical point in our analysis is how to control for repeated observations of the same subject or the same duopoly, when testing the signi…cance of the observed di¤erences across treatments. Before explaining more in detail the procedure we adopted, note that we have two types of data. Individual-level pertains to individual decisions by subjects and duopoly-level data refers to variables that always have the same value for the two members of a duopoly. For example, the presence of a cartel within a duopoly in a given period, or the fact that a given cartel is detected by the antitrust authority, are duopoly-level data, while the decision to communicate or not in a given period or the decision to unilaterally deviate from a collusive agreement are individual level data.
Given the structure of our game, we need to account for correlation between two observations from the same individual, as well as correlation between two observations from di¤erent individuals who belong to the same duopoly. Moreover, since we have run the experiment in two di¤erent cities, we must also control for the possible correlation among observations collected in the same city. For this purpose, we adopted a multilevel random e¤ect models.
Since in our experiment a subject may take part in more than one duopoly during the game, the random e¤ects at the subject level and at the duopoly level are not nested, making it di¢ cult to estimate a model with a random e¤ect both at the duopoly and individual level. To overcome this di¢ culty, we assume in our analysis of individual-level data, that there is a random e¤ect for every subject within any particular match -which accounts for the correlation among observations belonging to the same match. To account the possible correlation among observations relative to the same subject in di¤erent matches, we hypothesize that there is a second random e¤ect for every subject across di¤erent matches. Finally, we conjecture a third random e¤ect at the city level.
To analyze duopoly-level data we make the assumption that correlation between observations belonging to the same subject but to di¤erent duopolies can be disregarded. We therefore hypothesize to have only a random e¤ect at the duopoly level, nested with a random e¤ect at the city level.
The only independent variable of our simple regressions is the treatment, as a dummy. To analyze individual-level data, we adopt a four-levels model of the following form:
where h, i , j and k are indices for measurement occasions, subjects in matches, subjects across matches and cities, respectively. TREAT is the dummy variable for the treatment. Since we always compare only two treatments at a time, this variable takes value 1 in correspondence of one of the two treatments, and value 0 in correspondence of the other one.
(2) ijk represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city k (second level),
jk represents the random intercept for subject j in city k (third level) and (4) k represents the random intercept for city k (fourth level). Random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally distributed, with a variance that is estimated through our regression.
The general three-levels model we adopt when looking at duopoly-level data has the following form:
As above, h and k are indices for measurement occasions and cities, while l is the index for duopolies.
(2) lk and
k represent random intercepts at the duopoly and city levels. We ran logit regressions to analyze the decision to communicate, the decision to deviate, and the rates of cartel formation and of cartel detection; we adopted instead linear regressions for prices and agreed upon prices. To estimate our model we used an ordinary panel regression with random e¤ect, when the number of considered levels was equal to 2, while we used GLLAMM (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004 and http://www.gllamm.org) when the number of considered levels was equal or higher than three.
Results

Traditional and modern law enforcement
In this section we report the subjects'behavior in the Communication, Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The purpose is to assess how traditional antitrust law (Antitrust) and more modern law enforcement institutions embedded with a leniency program (Leniency) perform relative to a laisser faire regime (Communication). Our primary interest is to document how these di¤erent policies perform in terms of ex ante deterrence and their implications for the subjects' price choices. In addition we also report post conviction deterrence and prices, that is whether cartelists, after having been convicted, are deterred from reforming the dismantled cartel. We postpone our analysis of the LenRing and Reward treatments to two subsequent sections. Table 3 reports the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation provided that subjects are not currently cartel members. These rates are our main measures for evaluating the success of the di¤erent policies in terms of ex ante deterrence, that is the main objective of Antitrust policies.
Cartel Deterrence
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Result 1 (Ex ante deterrence) Traditional antitrust laws (Antitrust) are e¤ective in deterring explicit cartel formation and modern antitrust laws (Leniency) even more so. Result 1 re ‡ects that the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation are signi…cantly lower in Antitrust than in Communication. Moreover Leniency was even more successful in terms of ex ante deterrence since the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation were signi…cantly lower in Leniency than in Antitrust. Relative to Communication, the rates of individual communication attempts decreased by 31% in Antitrust and by 56% in Leniency. These di¤erences were even more striking for the rates of cartel formation, with a 55% and 77% decrease in Antitrust and Leniency respectively. This is line with Miller's (2007) estimate that leniency may be associated with a 52 percent decrease in the rate at 1 0 The Rates of communication are derived and tested using the binary individual decision to communicate in every period as a single observation. Similarly, the Rates of individual deviation are derived and tested using the individual decision to deviate from the last collusive agreement as a single observation. Here we consider only the cases in which the subjects had previously formed an agreement on prices.
The Rates of cartel formation are derived and tested using a single observation per duopoly and per period, indicating if in that period a cartel was formed. Note also that we only use periods in which no cartel pre-existed. The Rates of reporting are computed provided that a cartel was formed. A single observation indicates whether the cartel has been discovered in a period because at least one of the two cartel members reported it to the antitrust authority.
As explained above, we used a multilevel random intercept model to evaluate the signi…cance of the observed di¤erences. We adopted a four (three)-level random intercept logistic regression when using individual (duopoly)-level data. We ran a regression per each couple of treatments. 1 1 Our results are not perfectly comparable with those of Hinloopen and Soetevent because they report the rate of communication for all periods while we report the rate of communication provided that no cartel was formed previously. which cartels form. These results are also (partly) consistent with previous experimental results. Apesteguia et al. do …nd a reduction in the percentage of formed cartels (from 67% to 50%) when Leniency is introduced (compared to the case when …rms can report but there is no reduced …ne). Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) …nd a similar pattern as we do concerning the rate of cartel formation although they observe no signi…cant di¤erences between their antitrust and leniency treatments with respect to the rate of communication attempts. Table 3 also reports the rates of detection due to self reporting by subjects -a …rst source of cartel instability. The rate of reporting is small in Antitrust while it increases substantially and signi…cantly in Leniency. Hence:
Result 2 (Cartel stability and self-reporting) Modern antitrust laws (Leniency) reduce cartel stability due to self reporting.
Result 2 is in line with Miller's (2007) conclusion that leniency programs are associated with a 62% increase in the rate of detection, even though we observe an even higher increase. This is also consistent with Apesteguia et al. who …nd an increase of 50% of the detection rate.
Our experimental design also allows us to distinguish between di¤erent motives behind reporting behavior. As already mentioned, subjects can either report in order to protect themselves against …nes using the …rst reporting opportunity or they can report and punish their competitor after having observed the competitor's price choice. Clearly, we should expect to observe the former type of reports in Leniency only. By contrast, the latter opportunity to report in order to punish deviators may be observed both in Antitrust and Leniency, although one may argue that reports to punish should be rare in both treatments. In Antitrust, subjects may …nd it too costly to report and in Leniency, an optimal deviation involves a simultaneous secret report, implying that a cheated upon subject should not be able to punish by reporting. Table 4 reports the probability of using the …rst and second reports in Antitrust and Leniency. As expected, the probability of using the …rst report in Antitrust is very low. However subjects in Antitrust used costly second reports to punish defectors in almost 30 % of the cases they were cheated upon. Thus some subjects were willing to incur a quite large cost in order to punish deviators. In Leniency, the probability to use the …rst secret reporting stage while simultaneously undercutting the agreed upon price is slightly more than 70%. This is consistent with optimal deviations and the "protection gains …nes motive". Still a non-negligible number of subjects in Leniency were reluctant to use optimal deviations or cheap punishments. In almost 30 % of the cases when subjects deviated, they did not simultaneously report. In more than 50 % of the cases a rival deviated without reporting simultaneously, the cheated upon subject did not punish the defector by reporting the cartel.
Finally, Table 3 reports the rates of deviation from agreed upon prices -a second source of cartel instability.
Result 3 (Cartel stability and rate of deviation) Both traditional (Antitrust) and modern (Leniency) antitrust laws increase cartel stability by reducing the rate of deviations from agreed upon prices.
Result 3 re ‡ect that the rate of deviation in both the Antitrust and Leniency treatments are signi…cantly lower than in the Communication treatment. This suggests that antitrust polices may generate trust among subjects, provided that none of the subjects have previously reported the cartel. As we will see when we next comment on the subjects' price choices, this observation implies that current antitrust policies are not unambiguously positive despite the fact that they increase ex ante cartel deterrence (and, in the Leniency treatment also the probability of detection due to higher rates of self reporting).
Prices
The ultimate objective of antitrust law enforcement is to generate low prices. Table 5 presents for our …rst three treatments the average price, the average price within cartels, the agreed upon price and the average price given that subjects do not communicate. The …rst lesson to be drawn from this table is that cartel deterrence is desirable, since it reduces prices. Indeed, for each treatment in Table 5 , prices within cartels are higher than the prices without communication. (Although not reported, these di¤erences are statistically signi…cant.) Combined with our earlier …nding that Antitrust reduces the rate of cartel formation relative to Communication and that Leniency further reduces that rate, it suggests that average prices should be highest in Communication followed by Antitrust and lowest in Leniency. If anything, our data suggests the reverse: Note: For the Average price, a single observation is represented by the average among the prices chosen in a period by the two members of a duopoly. The same is true for Price within cartels, but here we only consider the cases in which the members of a duopoly have formed a cartel which has not been detected or reported yet. For Agreed upon prices we only consider the cases in which the subjects have communicated and found an agreement on the price to set. A single observation is given by the agreed upon price per duopoly, per period. For Price without communication we restrict our analysis to the cases in which no communication has taken place in the present period, and any possible previous agreement on prices has already been broken. A single observation is represented by the average among the prices chosen by the two members of a duopoly, in every single period. As explained above, we used a three-level random intercept linear model to compare the results across treatments since the analysis here concerns duopoly-level data. We ran a regression per each couple of treatments.
Result 4 (Average prices) Both traditional (Antitrust) and modern (Leniency) antitrust laws appear ine¤ective in reducing average prices.
Result 4 re ‡ects that, relative to Communication, average prices are higher in Antitrust or only slightly lower (although not signi…cantly so) in Leniency. This pattern suggests that both traditional and modern policies embedded with a leniency program may be counter productive and increase prices. The main driving force behind this result is that these policies appear to increase cartel stability (as noted in Result 3) and naturally this translates into higher prices within cartels (see Table 5 ).
Result 5 (Prices within cartels -what does not kill us makes us stronger) Both traditional (Antitrust) and modern (Leniency) antitrust laws increase cartel prices signi…cantly. Spagnolo (2000b) , Spagnolo (2001, 2006) and Ellis and Wilson (2001) suggested that antitrust policies embedded with a leniency program could have the e¤ect of stabilizing those cartels that are not deterred. Their idea was that reporting could be used as a punishment against deviators, since reporting is less costly with a leniency program. This potential explanation for the high cartel prices in Leniency is not completely convincing in the context of our experiment; since we allowed for secret reports, deviators could in e¤ect protect themselves against such punishments. In fact, one may argue that reports as threats against deviators should be more relevant in Antitrust, since optimal punishments in that treatment involve reports.
In our view, a probably more important reason for the increase in prices within cartels is that antitrust policies generate trust among cartel members provided that the cartels are not reported. It is also interesting to note that cartel prices are signi…cantly higher in Leniency than in Antitrust. This pattern suggests that the tougher the policy, the larger is the potential for generating trust among cartel members.
It is also interesting to note that the price levels for non cartel members appear to be higher (although insigni…cantly so) in the Antitrust and Leniency treatments than in the Communication treatments. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that a refusal to communicate when it is costly to do so, does not signal as clearly an unwillingness to cooperate. As a result, current antitrust policies may also facilitate tacit collusion. It should be emphasized, however, that because of higher deterrence, average prices overall are not signi…cantly higher in the Antitrust and Leniency treatments.
High expected …nes
To test the robustness of our …ndings to changes in and F , we ran the two additional treatments, AntiHigh and LenHigh with higher expected …nes of 60 ( = 0:2 and F = 300). Table 6 reports the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation as well as average prices and prices within and outside cartels. These …gures are compared with those for our original treatments, Antitrust and Leniency.
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The …rst lesson from this table is that higher expected …nes increase deterrence and reduce average prices under traditional antitrust laws but not under modern laws embedded with a leniency program. The reason is probably that the expected …ne mostly increased through an increase in the probability of detectionthis probability was doubled while the size of the …ne increased by 50 % only -and that under leniency, many cartels are reported irrespective of the probability of detection, thereby reducing subjects sensitivity to changes in that probability. Note also that the prices within cartels increased in the leniency treatment but not in the antitrust treatment. 
Post-conviction behavior
In this section we analyze agents'behavior after they are convicted and …ned for a cartel they had formed before. This is interesting for at least two important and related reasons. The …rst reason is that any law enforcement policy should generate, beside a general ex ante deterrence, an ex post deterrence, some times called desistance in the antitrust literature: the policy should ensure that convictions stop the convicted wrongdoer(s) from committing the crime again. The crucial question here is, therefore, how do convictions, in general and in particular when generated by di¤erent law enforcement policies (presence of leniency, size of …nes), a¤ect agents'following decision whether to form another cartel and -whether or not a new cartel is formed -their price choices? The topic is particularly interesting for antitrust in light of Sproul's (1993) empirical …nding that for a sample of US antitrust indictments prices often rose after antitrust conviction (see also the discussion in Whinston 2006). The second related reason why post-conviction behavior is important is that a number of recent studies, theoretical and experimental, suggest that in oligopolistic industries the payment of a large sunk cost by competitors may lead to an increase in prices, either because the sunk cost acts as a coordination device for explicit or tacit collusion (e.g. O¤erman and Potters 2006; Janssen 2006) , or because agents are subject to a 'sunk-cost bias', that is, they use simple mark-up pricing rules of thumb to try to recover the costs sunk by charging a higher markup (see e.g. Baliga et al. 2006 , who also describe how the best business administration textbooks in fact suggest these pricing rules based on average cost and mark ups as optimal ones). Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) noted that if these e¤ects were present and signi…cant in oligopolies, then the existing theory of optimal …nes could not be applied to cartels as commonly done in the antitrust debate (it would be misleading): it should …rst be extended to incorporate these e¤ects in the evaluation of the costs and bene…ts trade o¤s that lead to the optimal …nes. Figure 2 shows the cumulative number of new cartels (vertical axis) formed by convicted agents in the …ve periods following the conviction (horizontal axis), separately for our Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The plots are slightly 'optimistic', in the sense that some of the matches ended before the …ve periods after conviction occurred, possibly leading to a slight underestimation of the number of cartels that formed again after conviction. Still, the data tells us quite a lot. First, there is a large fraction of agents that do not form new cartels after having been convicted and …ned for a …rst cartel, even though our treatments are designed so that agents'situation in terms of expected …nes, discount factors, available actions and payo¤ functions after a conviction is exactly identical to that before the …rst convicted cartel was formed. What di¤ers after a conviction is only the history of play, as agents now have played several rounds, formed one or more cartels, and were convicted and …ned. If history or agents'experience did not matter, so that 'bygones are bygones', in our stationary framework we would expect all 'rational'agents that chose to form a cartel a …rst time and were convicted and …ned to form a new cartel the period after conviction. Instead, more than half of former cartelist did not form a new cartel after the conviction. This suggests that history and experience matter a lot in our experiment.
Ex post deterrence (or ' desistance' )
Second, there is a strong di¤erence between the ex post deterrence e¤ects of Antitrust and Leniency: close to 40% of convicted cartels come to life again in Antitrust treatments, but not in Leniency treatments. In other words, in our experiment the introduction of leniency policies produces a strong increase in desistance. Leniency policies appear much better at reducing recidivism than standard antitrust policies without leniency. This result is in stark contrast with Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) , who in their experiment …nd no improvement in desistance linked to the introduction of leniency policies. The reason behind their opposite result is, in our view, most likely due to their experimental set up not allowing for simultaneous self-reports and price deviations, as is possible in our experiment and in reality. As noted before, in our experiment most of convictions in the leniency treatments are linked to agents simultaneously undercutting cartel price and self-reporting. This joint action is likely to generate substantial more distrust among agents than a discovery by the competition authority, and thereby make it substantially more di¢ cult for convicted agents to trust each other again.
Post-conviction prices In his paper on the e¤ects of antitrust indictments on prices charged after the indictment -in the absence of an e¤ective leniency program -Sproul (1993) …nds that:
1.
On average prices rise gradually after an indictment for price …xing.
2.
The largest immediate drops in price after conviction are about 9-10 percent. 3.
Post-conviction prices are negatively correlated with the severity of penalties. Sproul suggests that some of the cartels he analyzes could involve e¢ ciencies, and imputes the increase in average prices to a loss of these e¢ ciencies. A comparison between his results and ours, particularly under Antitrust treatments (there was no serious leniency program at the time of the cartels studied by Sproul) might help to understand some aspects of the phenomenon under analysis. Figure 3 shows price choices in cartels before conviction (conviction takes place at time 0) and after conviction, separately for convicted agents that have formed again a new cartel and by those that did not do it, and for Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The stylized facts that emerge from our experiment are the following: a) Prices after conviction are on average lower than in cartels before conviction. b) When cartels are re-established after conviction, prices stabilize at levels close to those prevailing in the period when the cartel was convicted. c) When cartels are not re-established, prices fall substantially with respect to the prevailing cartel price at the time of conviction, and remain low. d) Post-conviction prices are higher in Leniency than in Antitrust treatments when a new cartel is formed after conviction, while the opposite happens when a new cartel is not formed after conviction.
The fact that average prices within cartels are restored after conviction and remain close to the level observed in the period in which the previous cartel was detected, appears consistent with Sproul's (1993) …ndings given that in our framework there are no e¢ ciencies linked to collusion. Note also that this …nding does not hinge on whether or not leniency is granted to the whistleblowers. Somewhat in contrast to Sproul (1993) we also …nd that in the large number of cases where a novel cartel is not formed after conviction, prices fall much below the level reached in the period in which detection took place, driving down average post-conviction prices. This …nding is more striking for the leniency treatments than the Antitrust ones: prices are much lower in the former treatments when new cartels do not form. Still, even focussing only on Antitrust treatments -at the time of Sproul's cartels an e¤ective leniency policy was not in place -it appears that prices fall on average after conviction. To explain why in his sample prices do not fall after indictment, Sproul hypothesizes that "the government mainly prosecutes cost-reducing cartels". Such an interpretation is not questioned by our data, since in our experiment cartels have no e¤ects on costs.
As for the e¤ects of Leniency, it appears to have the novel e¤ect of strongly increasing desistance thereby reducing average prices, even though prices are substantially higher in cartels that manage to form again after a conviction caused by a leniency application.
The di¤erence that arises between Leniency treatments and Antitrust treatments when players decide not to form a new cartel after being detected is also interesting (stylized fact d)). While under Leniency the average price remains close to Bertrand and to the level observed before the (detected) cartel arose, under Antitrust average non-collusive prices after detection rise as if -after having formed an explicit cartel and Figure 3 : Price before and after detection having experienced the …ne -some of the subjects try to reach a tacit agreement on prices. A possible interpretation of this e¤ect is that under Antitrust detection does not a¤ect trust between cartelists, while under Leniency detection and defection are often simultaneous, and the cartel is discovered because it is reported by the deviating player; therefore, post-conviction tacit collusion is more di¢ cult to achieve under Leniency.
Size of the …ne and post-conviction prices: ' sunk cost bias'and coordination e¤ects Antitrust …nes can be viewed as sunk costs incurred by convicted subjects. Recently, the literature has discussed the possible coordination role of sunk costs (e.g. O¤erman and Potters 2006) and the existence of a 'sunk cost bias' in decision making, whereby agents try to recover sunk costs by increasing their mark ups (Baliga et al. 2004) . To distinguish the two e¤ects, we hypothesized that the …rst e¤ect should imply improved coordination in general. That is, following an increase in …nes, coordination on higher prices should improve both when formerly convicted cartels did and did not reestablish the cartel. By contrast, if subjects are driven by a sunk cost bias, then an increased …ne should only increase post conviction prices when the former cartellists do not reform the cartel. Table 7 reports post conviction prices from our experiment, both within and outside cartels, and the level of the …nes levied on convicted agents. Consistently with one of Sproul's …nding, we observe a negative (although not always signi…cant) correlation between the size of the …ne and post-conviction prices. In our experiment this e¤ect is somehow puzzling, since even before getting …ned our subjects were informed about the size of the …ne and the probability of detection, so if they were fully rational they should not change their behavior after detection. A deeper analysis is required to understand the reasons that lead to this …nding. 14 We also observe that post conviction prices are generally lower when the …ne (and the expected …ne) is higher, both within cartels and outside cartels, whether leniency is granted to the "whistleblowers" or not. Consequently, our evidence seems to contradict the hypothesis of a sunk cost bias, which would a¤ect prices of …rms that choose not to re-establish a cartel after being …ned; our results also contradict the hypothesis of a coordination e¤ect of the …ne for cartels restored right after their detection.
To test the signi…cance of the observed di¤erence in post conviction prices between Antitrust and AntiHigh, and between Leniency and LenHigh, we estimated a three level random e¤ect linear model using GLLAMM, following the procedure explained in section 3.6. As mentioned above, this procedure allows us to keep into account the correlation between observations from the same duopoly, and also the correlation between observations from the same city. We notice that the di¤erences we observe are economically, but not statistically signi…cant in most of the cases. According to our results, the di¤erence in post conviction prices between Leniency and LenHigh is not signi…cant, neither within cartels nor outside cartels. On the other hand, the di¤erence between prices observed in Antitrust and AntiHigh is signi…cant, but only within cartels. This lack of statistical signi…cance may be due to the sample size, which is very small since we restrict our analysis only to the cases in which a cartel was discovered and dismantled in the previous period.
Ineligibility for Cartel Ringleader
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Under the US Corporate Leniency Policy, a …rm is ineligible for amnesty if it is the instigator of the cartel -the so called ringleader. In order to qualify for amnesty, the policy requires that the "corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or the originator of, the activity" (Corporate Leniency Policy, supra note 58). By contrast, and following the revision of the EU Leniency Notice in 2002, also the ringleader is eligible for amnesty in the EU. Whether or not ineligibility of the ringleader has desirable consequences in terms of deterrence and prices is not clear cut. Excluding the ringleader from the leniency program may increase deterrence if each …rm wait for some other …rm to take the initiative of forming the cartel. As noted by Leslie (2006) , however, extending amnesty to the ringleader may increase deterrence as well by ensuring that even the ringleader cannot be completely trusted, as it may also loose con…dence and rush to report under the leniency program. To evaluate the pros and cons of ringleader ineligibility, we ran the additional treatment, LenRing. Tables 8 and 9 compare the e¤ects on deterrence and on price levels of eliminating the possibility of amnesty for the ringleader. Three features are striking in these tables. First, the LenRing treatment has no signi…cant e¤ect on cartel deterrence relative to the Leniency treatment. Second, cartels appear to become more stable and third the LenRing treatment increase prices signi…cantly according to all our price measures. These …ndings are summarized in the next result 17 .
Result 7 (Ringleader) If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program, the deterrence e¤ect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise.
Result 7 thus suggests that the US practice of excluding the ringleader from the leniency program is unambiguously bad in our set up. While we …nd this result an interesting …rst step, that con…rms some observers'concerns that excluding ringleaders may reduce the e¤ectiveness of the leniency program, we should also emphasize one important caveat. In our experiment subjects were matched pairwise into duopolies to avoid social preferences e¤ects towards non-defecting third parties. This, however, is the worst conceivable situation for the US policy of excluding ringleaders, as the ban leaves only one cartel member with the option to self-report obtaining leniency, eliminating the incentives to "race to report" generated by the risk that another cartel member could do it before. With more than two …rms, therefore, it is likely that LenRing treatment will show more desirable properties. Therefore, further experimental research with many cartel members is needed before attempting to draw any policy implication.
Rewards
So far we have only considered policies that have been extensively implemented in reality. Given that none of these policies yielded fully satisfactory results, it is natural to turn attention to policies that have been advocated in the literature on optimal law enforcement. The type of policy that we consider here is one where the reporting subject gets rewarded by an amount equal to the …ne paid by its rival.
18 Tables 10 and  11 compare the e¤ects on deterrence and on price levels of introducing such reward schemes.
Result 6 (Ex post deterrence) Cartels are systematically reported in the Reward treatment.
This result is corroborated by Table 10 showing that the rate of detection due to reporting is almost equal to one in the Reward treatment. In fact, a simple inspection of the data in the Reward treatment reveals that almost every time a cartel was formed, at least one of the subjects reported it: out of the 120 times a cartel was formed, the cartel was reported during the …rst period in 118 cases. In one of the remaining cases, it was reported in the subsequent period, while there was only a single duopoly in which the players resisted the temptation of reporting and managed to sustain the collusive agreement for seven consecutive periods. This cartel ended because a re-matching took place. There are two potential explanations to this phenomenon. First the subjects could in principle exploit the reward system by taking turns in reporting and cashing in the reward. The second hypothesis, …rst proposed by Apesteguia et al, is that subjects form a cartel with the hope of fooling their competitor by undercutting the agreed-upon price and by reporting the cartel in order to cash in the reward. The next result con…rms this latter hypothesis.
Result 7 (Cartel stability) The antitrust policy with rewards signi…cantly reduces cartel stability.
This result is re ‡ected by the fact that the rate of individual deviation increased substantially in the Reward treatment. Note also that at least one subject undercut the agreed upon price in 111 out of the 118 cartels that only lasted one period.
Table 10 also suggests that the antitrust policy with rewards is not more e¢ cient in deterring cartels ex ante than the traditional policies. Indeed the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation in the Reward treatment are not signi…cantly di¤erent from corresponding rates in the Antitrust and Leniency treatments. Nevertheless:
Result 7 (Ex ante deterrence) The antitrust policy with reward strongly deters explicit cartel formation, the more the longer subjects play.
Result 7 is explained by the fact that the subjects eventually learned that it was not possible to form cartels for the purpose of cashing in the reward and, as a result, the number of formed cartels was reduced drastically. This appears clearly in Figure 4 showing that the number of cartels formed were reduced as subjects were re-matched.
Result 8 (Prices) The antitrust policy with rewards strongly reduces both prices in explicit cartels and subjects'ability to collude tacitly. The systematic reports when subjects took part in cartels probably undermined trust among the subjects and, as a result, also prices dropped (though not signi…cantly) in the Reward treatment. This is most striking in Table 11 where all measures of prices are the lowest in the Reward treatment. In particular, prices also dropped when subjects did not communicate. Thus prices were not only low because cartels were deterred from forming, giving further support for the claim that the systematic reports undermined trust. Rewarding whistleblowers appears therefore the only antitrust policy able to reduce price and increase welfare in our experimental set up.
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In theory, and contrary to any previous result in the economic literature on law enforcement, it is possible to achieve the …rst best of full deterrence with …nite …nes and no inspection probability using reward schemes (Spagnolo, , 2004 . To test this we ran an additional treatment RewLow, identical to Reward but for the probability of detection that we set at zero ( = 0). The results showed that some agents still need to try a couple of times to induce others to form a cartel just to report and cash the bonus. After a couple of attempts they learned that with the whistleblower reward scheme everybody reports immediately once a cartel forms, so that entering a cartel is never pro…table, and cartels disappear. The …rst best is therefore only achieved in asymptotic form. Indeed, after enough learning the subjects appear to converge to the …rst best. We also ran a third treatment, RewHigh, identical to RewLow but for a higher …ne (F = 1000). In this last treatment we observed a further increase in deterrence (the rate of communication attempts dropped to 25.9%, and the rate of cartel formation was 7.8%). Yet, full deterrence was not achieved even in this treatment, because at least some of the players still tried to form a cartel and to fool their opponent by deviating from the agreement and simultaneously reporting it.
As a …nal remark we stress that the results of our treatments with rewards forcefully con…rm the importance of learning in experimental settings with complicated/realistic games if we compare to those of Apesteguia et al. (2007) . In particular, the results show that the preliminary and surprising conclusion by Apesteguia et al. (2006) -that Rewards are not more e¤ective than Leniency -was premature and due to the subjects'inability to learn in that set up, as these authors already conjectured.
Culture, Trust and Antitrust
We ran our experiments in Stockholm and in Rome, two towns with quite distinct cultures. It is not obvious that one or the other culture should lead to more cartels. On the one hand, one may expect Italians to be more successful in colluding, given the framing of our experiment -cartel formation was presented as illegal -and given that Swedes often are thought to be more law abiding than Italians, . On the other hand, according to the World Values Survey (1999), there are important di¤erences between Sweden and Italy that may point in a di¤erent direction. In particular, when they were asked whether "information to help justice should be given to the authorities", 40.2 % of the Italians strongly agreed when only 26% of Swedes do. Moreover a majority of Swedes (63.7%) think that "people can be trusted" while only 31.8% Italian agreed. The di¤erence in the answers to the …rst question suggests that leniency programs could be more e¤ective in Italy. The di¤erence in the answers to the second question suggest that Swedes are more con…dent in the cooperation of partners, so that they are more likely to coordinate on collusive/cooperative equilibria.
Separating treatments according to location we found results consistent with the di¤erences in answers to the World Value Surveys: Swedes collude more often, coordinate on higher prices, and deviate much less often than Italians. In all treatments prices were lower and cartels less frequent in Italy than in Sweden, and defection and applications to leniency are much more frequent in Italy. According to our results, Nordic countries may be in more need of antitrust enforcement because of their 'cooperative'culture than southern ones.
Conclusions
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the e¤ects of …nes, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistleblowers on …rms' decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on their price choices. We consider an experiment in which subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with di¤erentiated goods, running several treatments di¤ering in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of …ne, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a …ne), the existence of a reward for reporting, and cartel leaders access to leniency. We …nd that …nes following successful investigations but without leniency have a deterrence e¤ect (reduce the number of cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive e¤ect (increase collusive prices in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more e¢ cient than standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they do deter a signi…cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they induce even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing average market price higher than without antitrust enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, which completely disrupts subjects'ability to form cartels and sustain high prices. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program the deterrence e¤ect of leniency does not increase while prices are higher than otherwise. As for tacit collusion, we …nd that under standard anti-trust enforcement or leniency programs, subjects who do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels) choose weakly higher prices than where there is no anti-trust enforcement. We also analyze post-conviction behavior, …nding that after convictions caused by a report under the leniency program much fewer cartels form, and prices are lower than when conviction takes place under standard antitrust policies without leniency. Finally, we …nd a strong cultural e¤ect in the deterrence power of the various law enforcement regime when comparing treatments in Stockholm and Rome.
Our results have policy implications for general deterrence of organized crime similar to cartels, and as a test for the theoretical results mentioned in Section 2 (the protection from …nes e¤ect, the reward e¤ect, the reporting as a threat and tacit collusion). Our results have only marginal implications for most of the many other theoretical papers, including cornerstone contributions to this literature.
For example, Motta and Polo (2003) , the …rst economic analysis on leniency programs, focuses mainly on the e¤ects of the second part of the leniency programs opened to …rms already under prosecution. The only implication of our experimental results for that paper is that they do not support its two policy conclusions that (i) to have deterrence e¤ects leniency programs must be opened to …rms already under investigation (in our experiment they aren't), and that (ii) introducing a leniency program is a second best choice relative to standard antitrust law enforcement if there is a large enough budget. Analogous, Harrington (forthcoming) does not consider general deterrence but focuses on desistance e¤ects, i.e. the ability of law enforcement mechanism to shorten the duration of cartels that were not deterred by the mechanism. It also introduces a stochastic movement in a law enforcement parameters to generate equilibrium applications of cartel members to the leniency schemes. The only implication of our experimental results for that paper is that our real world agents did form cartels and then apply for leniency in our fully deterministic, stationary oligopolistic environment. This suggests that deterministic theoretical analyses are satisfactory in the sense that they are not at odds with the evidence that people form cartels and then report them. Aubert et al. (2006) do focus on the …rst part of leniency programs, on general deterrence and on rewards, but their contribution is about the costs and bene…ts of providing leniency and rewards to the individual employees of colluding …rms. In our experiment we only have single decision makers, so we have no evidence relevant to that issue. This sounds, however, as an exciting topic for future experimental work.
Appendix 1: Instructions for the Leniency 1 treatment
Welcome to this experiment about decision making in a market. The experiment is expected to last for about 1 hour and 45 minutes. You will be paid a minimum of 7 Euros for your participation. On top of that you can earn more than 30 Euros if you make good decisions.
We will …rst read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to read them on your own. If you then have questions, raise your hand and you will be helped privately.
In summary, the situation you will face is the following. You and one other participant referred to as your competitor produce similar goods and sell them in a common market. As in most markets, the higher the price you charge, the more you earn on each sold good, but the fewer goods you sell. And, as in many markets, the lower the price charged by your competitor, the more customers he or she will take away from you and the less you will sell and earn. It is possible, however, to form a cartel with your competitor, that is, you will have the possibility to communicate and try to agree on prices at which to sell the goods. In reality, cartels are illegal and if the government discovers the cartel, cartel members are …ned. In addition members of a cartel can always report it to the government. The same happens in this experiment. If you communicate to discuss prices, even if both of you do not report, there is still a chance that the 'government' discovers it and if this happens, you will have to pay a '…ne'. If you report, and if you are the only one to report, you will not pay any …ne but your competitor will pay the full …ne. Conversely, if only your competitor reports the cartel, you will pay the full …ne and your competitor will not pay any …ne. If instead both of you report the cartel you will both pay 50% of the …ne.
Timing of the experiment In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions in several periods. You will be paired with another participant for a sequence of periods. Such a sequence of periods is referred to as a match. You will never know with whom you have been matched in this experiment.
The length of a match is random. After each period, there is a probability of 85% that the match will continue for at least another period. So, for instance, if you have been paired with the same competitor for 2 periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a third period is 85%. If you have been paired with the same competitor for 9 periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a tenth period is also 85%.
Once a match ends, you will be paired with another participant for a new match, unless 20 periods or more have passed. In this case the experiment ends. So, for instance, if 19 periods have passed, with a probability of 15% you are re-matched, that is you are paired with another participant. If 21 periods have passed, with a probability of 15% the experiment ends.
When you are re-matched you cannot be …ned anymore for a cartel formed in your previous match with your previous competitor.
The experimental session is expected to last for about 1 hour and 45 minutes but its actual duration is uncertain; that depends on the realization of probabilities. For this reason, we will end the experimental session if it lasts more than 2 hours and 30 minutes.
Before the experiment starts, there will be 5 trial periods during which you will be paired with the same competitor. These trial periods will not a¤ect your earnings. When the experiment starts, you will be paired with a new competitor.
Prices and Pro…ts
In each period you choose the price of your product. Your price as well as the price chosen by your competitor determines the quantity that you will sell.
The higher your price, the more you earn on each sold good, but the fewer goods you sell. Therefore your price has two opposing e¤ects on your pro…t. On the one hand, an increase in your price may increase your pro…t, since each good that you sell will earn you more money. On the other hand, an increase in your price may decrease your pro…t, since you will sell less.
Furthermore, the higher the price of your competitor, the more you will sell. As a result, your pro…ts increase if your competitor chooses a higher price.
To make things easy, we have constructed a pro…t table. This table is added to the instructions. Have a look at this table now. Your own prices are indicated next to the rows and the prices of your competitor are indicated above the columns. If you want to know your pro…t if, for example, your competitor's price is 5 and your price is 4, then you …rst move to the right until you …nd the column with 5 above it, and then you move down until you reach the row which has 4 on the left of it. You can read that your pro…t is 160 points in that case.
Your competitor has received an identical table. Therefore you can also use the table to learn your competitor's pro…t by inverting your roles. That is, read the price of your competitor next to the rows and your price above the columns. In the previous example where your price is equal to 4 and your competitor's price is equal to 5, it follows that your competitor's pro…t is 100 points.
Note that if your and your competitor's prices are equal, then your pro…ts are also equal and are indicated in one of the cells along the table's diagonal. For example, if your price and the price of your competitor are equal to 1, then your pro…t and the pro…t of your competitor is equal to 38 points. If both you and your competitor increase your price by 1 point to 2, then your pro…t and the pro…t of your competitor becomes equal to 71.
Note also that if your competitor's price is su¢ ciently low relative to your price, then your pro…t is equal to 0. The reason is that no consumer buys your good, since it is too expensive relative to your competitor's good.
Fines In every period, you and your competitor will be given the opportunity to communicate and discuss prices. If both of you agree to communicate, you will be considered to have formed a cartel, and then you might have to pay a …ne F. This …ne is given by: F = 200 points You can be …ned in two ways. First, you and your competitor will have the opportunity to report the cartel. If you are the only one to report the cartel, you will not pay any …ne but your competitor will pay the full …ne, that is 200 points. Conversely, if only your competitor reports the cartel and you do not, then you will have to pay the full …ne equal to 200 points and your competitor will not pay any …ne. Finally, if both of you report the cartel, you will both pay 50% of the …ne, that is 100 points.
Second, if neither you nor your competitor reports the cartel, the government discovers it with the following probability.
Probability of detection = 10%.
Note that you will run the risk of paying a …ne as long as the cartel has not yet been discovered or reported. Thus you may pay a …ne in a period even if no meeting takes place in that period. This happens if you had a meeting in some previous period which has not yet been discovered or reported.
Once a cartel is discovered or reported, you do not anymore run the risk of paying a …ne in future periods, unless you and your competitor agree to communicate again.
Earnings The number of points you earn in a period will be equal to your pro…t minus an eventual …ne or plus an eventual reward. Note that because of the …ne, your earnings may be negative in some periods. Your cumulated earnings, however, will never be allowed to become negative.
You will receive an initial endowment of 1000 points and, as the experiment proceeds, your and your competitor's decisions will determine your cumulated earnings. Note that 20 points are equal to 1 SEK. Your cumulated earnings will be privately paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
Decision making in a period Next we describe in more detail how you make decisions in each period. A period is divided into 7 steps. Some steps will inform you about decisions that you and your competitor have made. In the other steps you and your competitor will have to make decisions. In these steps, there will be a counter indicating how many seconds are left before the experiment proceeds to the next step. If you fail to make a decision within the time limit, the computer will make a decision for you.
Step 1: Pairing information and price communication decision Every period starts by informing you whether or not you will play against the same competitor as in the previous period.
Remember that if you are paired with a new competitor, you cannot be …ned anymore for cartels that you formed with your previous competitors. In this step you will also be asked if you want to communicate with your competitor to discuss prices. A communication screen will open only if BOTH you and your competitor choose the "YES" button within 15 seconds. Otherwise you will have to wait for an additional 30 seconds until pricing decisions starts in Step 3.
Step 2: Price communication After the communication screen has opened, you can "discuss" prices by choosing a price out of the range { 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12 }. In this way you can indicate to your competitor the minimum price that you …nd acceptable for both of you. When both of you have chosen a price, these two prices are displayed on the computer screen. You can then choose a new price but now this price should be greater or equal to the smaller of the two previously chosen prices. This procedure is repeated until 30 seconds have passed. The screen then displays the smaller of the two last chosen prices, which is referred to as the agreed-upon price. Note, however, that in the next step, neither you nor your competitor is forced to choose the agreed-upon price.
Step 3: Pricing decision You and your competitor must choose one of the following prices: 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12. When you choose your price, your competitor will not observe your choice nor will you observe his or her price choice. This information is only revealed in Step 5. The experiment proceeds after 30 seconds have passed. If you fail to choose a price within 30 seconds, then your price is chosen so high that your pro…ts will be 0.
The experiment proceeds to the …rst reporting decision in
Step 4 if you communicated in
Step 2 or if in previous periods you formed a cartel not yet discovered or reported. Otherwise you have to wait for 10 seconds until market prices are revealed in Step 5.
Step 4: First (secret) reporting decision By choosing to push the "REPORT" button, you can report that you have been communicating in the past. As described above, if you are the only one to report, you will not pay the …ne; the opposite happens if only your competitor reports; and if both of you report, you will both pay 50% of the …ne.
If you do not wish to report, push instead the "DO NOT REPORT" button. When you decide whether or not to report, your competitor will not observe your choice, nor will you observe his or her choice. This information is only revealed when market prices are revealed in Step 5.
If you do not reach a decision within 10 seconds, your default decision will be "DO NOT REPORT".
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision In this step your and your competitor's prices and pro…ts are displayed. In case you have formed a cartel not yet discovered or reported, the screen will also display whether or not you or your competitor reported it in the …rst reporting step (Step 4). If not, you will get a new opportunity to report.
If you wish to report, push the "REPORT" button. If you do not wish to report, push instead the "DO NOT REPORT" button.
Again, if you are the only one to report, you will not pay the …ne. On the contrary, f your competitor reports and you don't you will have to pay the …ne and he will not. If both you and your competitor report, you will both pay 50% of the …ne, that is 100 points.
Step 6: Detection probability If this step is reached, you formed a cartel either in the current period or in previous periods. Furthermore the cartel has not yet been discovered or reported. The cartel can nevertheless be discovered. This happens with a probability of 10%. If the cartel is discovered, you and your competitor will have to pay the full …ne of 200 points.
Step 7: Summary In this step you learn the choices made in the previous steps: your and your competitor's price choices and pro…ts, your eventual …ne, your eventual reward and your earnings.
If you paid a …ne in this period, you will also know whether your competitor reported the cartel or the government discovered it.
In case a cartel was detected or reported in this period, you will not run any risk of being …ned in future periods, unless you and your competitor discuss prices again.
Step 7 will last for 20 seconds.
Period ending and ending of the experimental session After
Step 7, a new period starts unless 20 or more periods have passed and the 15% probability of pair dismantling takes place. In that case, the experiment ends.
The following time line summarizes the seven steps of each round. Throughout the experiment, a table will keep track for you of the history with your current competitor. For each previous period played with your current competitor, this table will show your price and pro…t, your competitor's price and pro…t as well as your eventual …ne.
Payments At the end of the experiment, your earnings in points will be exchanged in SEK. In addition you will be paid the show up fee of 50 SEK.
Before being paid in private, you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire about the experiment and you will have to handle back the instructions.
Please read now carefully the instructions on your own. If you have questions, raise your hand and you will be answered privately.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERIMENT AND GOOD LUCK!
